The Cultural Chasm Hurts Democrats With Trump Supporters

Focus groups, a dime a dozen are often used as self-fulfilling prophecies, with practitioners cherry picking facts and the data to fit their preconceived notions.  Still, it is useful to pay attention to them from time to time.  One recent study, from Democratic pollster Stanley Greenburg, stands out.

Greenburg, an icon in partisan polling circles, interviewed 35 Independent and Democratic voters from Macomb County, Michigan.  All supported Trump.  All these voters are considered swing voters and all showed consistent loyalty to Trump throughout the focus group even as Greenburg concluded his report by saying Democrats could win over these voters by pivoting leftward on economic issues.

The report should be required reading for Democrats seeking a path out of the political wilderness.  For while the Democrats majority-minority, college educated,white female and upper suburbanite base is frothing at the mouth in anger at Trump, the party’s former backers are not. Yes, Democrats could make small gains with Trump supporters in the Midwest if they become more populist.  But, the cultural disconnect between the party and Trump voters is so wide it is hard to see Democrats making the necessary compromises to win over this disaffected constituency and maintain their hold on their current support.

Now, despite Greenburg’s partisan leanings he does know what he is doing.  He was the original pioneer of the idea of “Reagan Democrats” in the 1980’s when he conducted several studies on the county’s voters.  For while these voters have always had Democratic leanings they have never been solid Democrats.  Consider Obama won Michigan by 10 points in 2012 but he only won the county by four points.  Still, this made Greenburg wonder whether the county’s blue collar roots still mattered.  That was until last year when Trump won the county by a commanding 12 points and commanded a 50,000+ vote advantage that helped him carry the state.

Among some of the study’s most notable findings were 1) Trump’s base is extremely loyal, 2) culture matters, 3) Obamacare is still unpopular and 4) few of these voters are receptive to supporting Democrats.  Let’s take each of these in turn.

1. Trump’s base is loyal: Not a single voter in the survey said they regretted voting for Trump.  This, despite the President languishing with 40 percent approval ratings.  Additionally, these voters liked his “bluntness,” “outspokenness,” and “honesty.”  They further accepted Trump’s version of the news and facts and their reactions to videos of his press conferences and interviews reinforced the point, Greenburg wrote.

In the GOP’s quest to implement its agenda on America this loyalty matters.  For example, the NY Times had a story out Sunday questioning whether the party could hold the blue-collar Midwest and repeal Obamacare.  Except, many of these voters dislike the law (more on this in a second) and they trust the President.  They see the benefits of healthcare as a result of Trump, not the former President, and they believe Trump will look out for their interests.  Even if it means challenging Republican leaders in Congress.

2. It’s the culture, stupid: Greenburg believes the party can make gains with these voters on economics but read between the lines and it is clear even Greenburg believes this has limited pull with these voters.  While these voters align with Democrats on several major issues (including entitlements and healthcare) on cultural issues they are miles apart.  These Trump voters cited concerns about terrorism, immigration and lack of integration, worsening race relations and more.  Such talk dominated the focus group, even among those who once backed Obama.

3. Obamacare’s newfound national popularity did not show in the focus group: Democrats are crowing about Obamacare’s newfound popularity, even among Trump/Obama supporters.  One problem, it did not show in the focus group.  Indeed, many participants in the survey shared horror stories about their health insurance as a consequence of Obamacare, citing personal examples of how the law was a hardship for them.

Citing the group, Greenburg writes, “early every per­son in our group was struggling with how to afford their plans, co-pays, and med­ic­a­tions.”  No concrete alternatives were discussed but they did show they had faith in Trump to fix the healthcare system and look out for their best interests.

4. The biggie, no one expressed receptivity to supporting Democrats: If Democrats want to regain control of Congress they are going to have to make gains in the Midwest and the focus group’s responses highlight the party’s struggle.  Despite agreeing with general liberal policy preferences the group did not show much receptivity to supporting Democratic candidates.

Greenburg notes about two-thirds of the focus group supported a generic, populist Democrat more than a moderate, business friendly candidate who supports globalization.  That’s great and all, but generic candidates do not win elected office.  Actual candidates do.  Greenburg puts a pitch in for progressive icons like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren who fit the populist profile.  But, the focus group did not seem enthusiastic about either.  Worse, the group showed little support for any other progressive icon on the horizon (including Joe Biden).

The study was commissioned by a progressive think-tank so it is little wonder Greenburg sprinkles in analysis with optimistic takeaways and pronouncements.  Except, these voters gave no indication they were giving up on Trump anytime soon.

The study should stand as yet another warning for the party.  Despite becoming more diverse and multi-cultural, the party has limited its electoral reach.  By putting the blame of worsening race relations, a stagnant economy, wage inequality, intolerance, bigotry and more squarely on the shoulders of blue-collar whites they have bled their cultural connection to these voters.

Democrats for years have had warnings this was coming.  All the way back in 1992, Bill Clinton recognized his party was out of step with these voters and took on the worse excesses of his party in a bid to redefine what a Democrat was.  He was extremely successful, winning back Macomb County for his party in 1996.  In subsequent elections, his party did not follow suit.  Al Gore won the county narrowly in 2000 and George Bush took it in 2004 (thanks to John Kerry’s inept campaign).  While the county backed Obama in 2008 and 2012, it did so only because Obama ran as a populist in the region, seeking to defend the average Joe from a Republican (Mitt Romney) that would ship their job overseas.

These voters were never really loyal to the Democratic Party even as they backed Obama.  They backed Congressional Republicans up and down the ballot that year, in the prior midterm  and the midterm after.  Since Clinton, Democrats have been losing their appeal to these voters.  Now, any cultural connection the party has with these voters is gone.  That’s great news for Trump and Republicans.  It is bad, bad news for a reeling Democratic Party.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Millennials Aren’t Saving The Democratic Party

Still smarting over a humbling defeat in 2016 and a daunting Congressional map in 2018 the party is looking forward to 2020.  Specifically, because of President Trump’s persistent weakness with Millennials and their potent growth they are poised to offer the party a pathway forward to power.

Writing in the Atlantic, Ronald Brownstein lays out the basic Democratic premise.  By 2020, the share of the electorate represented by Millennials is expected to eclipse Boomers.  They continue to oppose Trump at higher rates than other generations of voters and Democrats hope Trump makes the GOP irreversibly racist in their eyes.

But, this analysis (Democrats, not Brownstein’s), is overly simplistic at best and devoid of data at worst. Consider, that in 2000 Bush and Gore split the youth vote.  A mere four years later Kerry won them by nine and Obama carried them by a massive 36 and 30 point margins.  Trump lost Millennials by a small margin than Romney.  Not necessarily an indication of an increasingly liberal bloc.

Of course, not all Millennials are the same.  Trump did not need to do better with all Millennials.  Just certain Millennials.  For comparison, Romney and Obama actually ran close to even among college educated white Millennials.  But among blue-collar Millennials Romney won by 10.  Now flip the script and Hillary ran circles around Trump with white, college educated Millennials.  But Trump won blue-collar Millennials in the right states by massive margins.

Take a look at some of Brownstein’s analysis.  “Exit polls found Trump reduced the GOP deficit among those younger voters compared with Romney in 2012 in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and he actually carried voters under 30 in Iowa. In all of those states except Michigan, Clinton’s vote share among those younger than 30 fell by double digits compared with Obama’s, while Trump improved by 7 to 9 percentage points over Romney. Trump also significantly improved over Romney among young people in New Hampshire and Maine, two mostly white states. Even in the coastal and Sunbelt states where Trump’s vote share among young people was either stagnant or slightly below Romney’s, Clinton’s numbers usually lagged Obama’s, sometimes significantly, as more Millennials drifted away to the third-party options.”

Further complicating Democratic hopes, the share of college educated Millennials in many of the swing states heading into the 2020 election are unlikely to change by a significant percentage.  Sure, Democrats might find somebody better able to appeal to them but odds are good that will turn off their college educated base.  Everything in politics involves a trade-off.

Just look at how the baby boomer vote has shifted over the years.  In 2000, Bush and Gore deadlocked.  But in every election since they have become increasingly Republican.  Unlike Millennials, Boomers also vote far above their actual demographic numbers.  Millennials, not to much.

Democrats would counter Millennials might even turn Georgia or Arizona, perhaps Texas, in four years.  But if they could not pull it this year when every dirty secret about Trump was aired, what are the chances it will happen in 2020?  If nothing else, no higher.

In 2016, Clinton put a massive amount of importance on their votes.  She had reason according to the polls.  Again, according to Brownstein, “In one survey for the liberal groups Project New America and NextGen Climate, which looked solely at Millennials across 11 battleground states, three-fourths of them described him as a racist; roughly an equal number said he was biased against women; and almost 70 percent said they would be “ashamed” for the country if he won.” Yet, on Election Day, Clinton only won 55 percent of their votes.

A common theory batted around about this is that these voters were drawn third party candidates because of James Comey.  But the only exit poll to ask third party supporters who they would vote for if it was Trump or Clinton found a massive 55 percent would not even show up.

Further presenting problems for Democrats in the run-up to the midterms is Millennials have horrible turnout in midterms.  In 2010 and 2014 turnout dropped precipitously from the prior Presidential elections.

It is also unclear how late generation Millennials and the up and coming Social Media generation will shape the path of the youth vote.  John Sides notes that generations of voters tend to lean more towards the opposite party than the one of the President they grew up under. Worse, while the youngest voters are the most diverse they also seem to behave the most conservatively on fiscal issues.

Predicting long-term is a horrible business in politics.  But, we do know Millennial turnout is likely to drop next year.  Even if it it increases massively in 2020 the Presidential map will likely be fought on turf more favorable to the GOP than not.  Whether Millennials can, and will, help Democrats beyond that is the question.

My word of advice for the party.  Don’t put all your eggs in that basket.  Just ask how that turned out for Hillary Clinton.

 

 

 

 

Do special elections tell us much?

We are only a month into President Trump’s first term and already we have seen a series of special elections with divergent results.  First, a series of special elections in Virginia went as expected with two GOP leaning districts and solidly blue district going their usual way.  But, then a special election in a blue leaning Iowa Senate district went a shade of dark blue.  Most recently, a special election in a Minnesota house district that backed Trump by 29 points favored the GOP nominee by a mere 6 points.

All this begs the question of whether this is a sign of the Trump effect and its consequences for down-ballot Republicans?  Traditionally, it is often Democrats that suffer in low-key special elections, especially in legislative contests.  But, with special elections coming up to determine control of the Delaware, Connecticut and Washington State senates, the trend seems to lean in Democrats favor.  More so, it suggests Democrats are primed to do well in 2018.  Or are they?  Are special elections really that predictive?

A brief look at recent history gives a mixed message.  In 2009, Republicans had an excellent shot at capturing two special elections, John Murtha’s old district and and an-upstate NY district.  In both cases, contrary to opinion polls and the general mood of the country, Democrats won these open seat races.  But, in both cases, Republicans nominated flawed candidates and Democrats ran excellent candidates that fit their districts.  Months later Republicans would gain 63 seats in the House (but neither of these seats).

In 2011, Republicans giddy off their 2010 success believed they could easily hold a conservative, upstate NY seat.  But, the GOP nominated a weak candidate and Democrats smartly nominated a local candidate who ran against the GOP plans to reform entitlements.  Additionally, a wealthy, third-party candidate ran under the Tea Party banner and arguably split the right leaning vote.  The district, older and whiter than most was especially susceptible to such arguments.  Republicans blew the election.  Yet, a mere five months later Republicans would capture a Brooklyn based district in part on fears Obama was turning against Jews.

These elections told us little about the environment heading into 2012.  Indeed, both districts would throw out their special election winners during the Presidential election in November.

Legislative special elections, because they are so common, often give us conflicting stories heading into an election.  For example, in 2013, a WA State Senate special election in a blue leaning district that flipped Republican shifted 6 points from Obama to the Republican candidate.  This seemed to indicate Democrats were in trouble heading into 2014.  Except, Democrats soon after won another special election in the state a month later.

Even more recently, in 2015 Republicans were giddy about taking the Kentucky House for the first time in 100 years.  Yet, in four special elections held in a month, Democrats won three and kept the House.  A few months later Republican Matt Bevin would win the Governorship and a year later the party would almost capture a super-majority in the House.

As hinted at above, special elections often represent the prevailing views of the time and local events.  Sure, it was easy for Democrats to win races in NY by running against entitlement reform and a split opposition just as it was easy for Republicans to run against Obama in an upscale, suburban Puget Sound seat.  Oftentimes, these races can be swung by singular events at the time that fade as a national election approaches.

Legislative special elections might tell us even less than Congressional special elections.  If we took the Virginia legislative results from earlier this year at face value we would assume Republicans would do fine next year.  But, now a series of special elections tell us that might not be the case.  Except, the general election is 21 months from now and Republicans are embroiled in a crisis of rule.  Who is to say this will continue into next year?

Indeed, who is to say it even continues for a few weeks? Republicans have a chance to take the Delaware State Senate for the first time since the 1960’s in a district local Republicans run well in (not so much at the federal level).  If Republicans win this seat the narrative will completely flip.

WA State is also set to have a special election that will determine control of their state senate.  The district went 65-28 for Clinton but has a tendency to elect moderate, Republican legislators (the moderate, Republican incumbent died of lung cancer).  Imagine if Republicans managed to hold this seat?

Finally, a series of Congressional special elections are coming down the pike.  In Kansas, Mike Pompeo’s seat is open.  In South Carolina, Mick Mulvaney’s district is vacant after he became OMB Director.  Finally, the crown jewel for the left is Tom Price’s seat in Georgia.  The seat flipped from a 20+ point district for Romney to a 47-46 win for Trump.  At the same time it elected Tom Price by 20+ points.

Measuring the impact of these districts results is an imperfect art.  Certainly, comparisons to how these districts behaved last year will be the norm.  Little attention will probably be paid to the individual candidates themselves or the local/national issues percolating in each district.  But these results might not tell us much.  National events will play significantly in these races as will the strengths of the candidates themselves.  If anything, the strength of Democratic candidates in a series of special elections (leading to victories) made it seem as if the party was better off than it was heading into 2010 (in fact, Democrats had a streak of Congressional double-digit wins in special elections until 2011).

So, long story short, special elections can tell us something and nothing at once.  They can point to the general trend of politics at one time.  But they tend to be pretty lousy at predicting general election results a year and a half or even months away.

Minnesota Puts To Rest The Gerrymandering Is Destiny Theory

Democrats have suffered historic losses in recent years.  While honest Democrats will admit that their losses are due to self-inflicted wounds including Obamacare, ignoring the concerns of blue-collar workers and focusing almost exclusively on a urban coalition, less honest Democrats seek a scapegoat not of their making.  That scapegoat is gerrymandering.

After the 2010 election Republicans had the ability to draw lines in dozens of states to their advantage.  They did this to deadly effect in states all across the Midwest and the South.  But, in handful of states, including Minnesota, the idea that gerrymandering is PRIMARILY responsible for the Republican advantage in the states and Congress is shown as a lie.

Minnesota has not voted for a statewide, federal Republican candidate since 2002.  Donald Trump’s narrow loss was the first time since the 60’s when the state was more Republican than the nation.  Minnesota’s substantial leftward tilt in statewide races can be attributed to the power of urban Minneapolis and St. Paul and the power of GOP leaning suburbs and rural areas cannot match the raw vote share of these areas (unlike Wisconsin, Pennsylvania or Michigan).

While the Twin Cities give Democrats an advantage in statewide races (which has been eroding for some time) the same cannot be said for legislative races.  Indeed, a federal court redrew the legislative lines in a nonpartisan manner in 2011 the legislature has traded hands.  Republicans held the legislature for two years (2010-2012), lost it, regained the state House in 2014 and gained additional seats in the state House and regained the state Senate by a single seat last November.

Democrats have been beset by a number of issues in many states, not just in Minnesota.  The party suffers from having many of its voters clustered in urban, dense locales and in limited geographies.  This leads to thousands of wasted votes while the Republican vote is better distributed.

But, according to calculations by the Daily Kos, the median district in Minnesota is actually pretty close to the median district in the United States.  The median district in the US is 3.4 percent more Republican than the nation (according to the 2016 election).   The median district in Minnesota has about a 3 percent GOP edge.  Pretty similar eh?  Again, the GOP did not even draw the lines in Minnesota and this is including the fact the Daily Kos’s calculations do not factor in redistricting in big, blue states like California because the map was drawn by an “independent commission.”

Democrats will of course point to gerrymanders in states like Wisconsin to prove their point.  States such as Wisconsin do have effective gerrymanders.  But shifting voter preference has also played a significant factor.

Sticking with Minnesota as the star of the article, Trump won five of the state’s legislative districts (despite three of them being held by rural, conservative to moderate Democrats).  A mere four years ago Romney only won three of these districts (and no, the state did not go through a mid-decade redistricting).

The contrast between the legislative district results between 2012 and 2016 are even more striking.  Donald Trump carried 39 of the state’s 67 senate districts and 72 of the state’s 134 house districts.  In 2012, Romney only carried 66 house districts.  It is the state Senate where the bottom has fallen out for the party.  Romney only carried 29 senate seats but this go-round Trump carried a whopping 39.  It bears repeating, under a nonpartisan map.  It is very likely this scenario is similarly repeated in nonpartisan redistricting states such as Iowa because of the shifting nature of the parties coalitions.

To be fair, down-ballot Democrats found success even as Trump was carrying their districts.  Seven Democrats represent Trump supporting Senate districts while only two Republicans sit in Clinton supporting districts.  In the House, seven Democrats sit in Trump districts and 12 Republicans in Clinton districts (quite a bit of crossover).  But, this does make it harder for candidates to outrun the top of the ticket for obvious reasons.

This is not to say that gerrymandering has not contributed to the GOP success.  But arguing it is the primary reason is tenuous at best and most likely finds its most receptive audience in the ears of partisans desperate to explain the fate of their party.

 

Democrats Looking To Take Back House Have a Tough Road To Hoe

Recently the DCCC released its list of targets for 2018 (I have some initial thoughts here).  Some of the targets on the list raised eyebrows such as eight districts that voted for Trump by an eye popping 20 points or more.  But, while the list also featured some perennial targets (VA-10, CO-6, FL-26) it also had some interesting newcomers.

None seem more interesting than TX-32 and TX-7.  Pete Session’s 32nd district in Texas, anchored in the Dallas suburbs, swung 17 percent to Clinton.  But, while this was happening, Pete Sessions won reelection 71 percent to 19 percent (against a 3rd party libertarian candidate).

Meanwhile, the 7th district, based in the Houston exurbs, also swung wildly to Clinton.  Republican John Culberson won reelection but by a mere 13 points (compared to Sessions).  Romney won the district by over 20 points four years earlier.

Democrats have made it a point to build infrastructure and compete in districts they ignored last year.  The party has already hired 20 full-time staffers in GOP districts across the nation including the two districts above.  Democrats even went so far as to hold a training for elected officials on how to talk to rural voters.

But, if one wants to look at how Democrats fared in the past in these districts consider 2014 and 2012 in both districts.  Sessions won reelection in 2012 by 19 percent and in 2014 by 27 percent.  Culberson won in 2012 by 24 percent and in 2014 by 28 percent.

There will probably be a lot of talk in the coming months about upscale GOP districts being on the table due to Trump and moderate, highly educated Republicans abandoning him.  But, remember, the same was said of more moderate, swing districts last year.  In many cases a large majority of these districts stayed Republican.

Democrats in traditionally moderate, highly educated swing districts at least have infrastructure and a plan to compete in these districts.  Many of those districts sit in demographically fast changing places like California, Virginia, Florida and Colorado.

But suburban, Texas seats are another matter.  Seats such as these, and other Southern suburban or rural Republican seats are in places where Democrats have not competed in a decade or more.  The party lacks infrastructure, messaging and even a local on the ground presence.

This leaves Democrats scrambling to try and make these seats competitive.  Yet, in a horrible year for Republicans last November, down-ballot Republicans easily resisted the Trump drag.  Likewise, many conventional Republicans in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and North Carolina outran Trump.  One could even argue in many strongly Republican seats voters behaved the way they did knowing Trump would still win their state.

Democrats are already trying to steal a suburban, Southern district in Georgia (Tom Price’s soon to be old seat) that swung from a 20 point Romney victory to a one point edge for Trump.  Price still won reelection by over 20 points last fall.

Democrats lack a compelling message and the aforementioned campaign infrastructure.  Suburban Republicans might not like Trump but he is not on the ballot and Democrats making that case will need a lot of help from the Donald himself.  Despite his early blunders, Trump does not seem to be obliging them.

 

 

 

Democrats Special Election Dreaming

Much as Republicans embarrassed Democrats in 2010 by stealing the late “liberal lion” Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat, Democrats are hoping for the same magic in likely HHS Secretary and current Congressman Tom Price’s suburban Atlanta based district.

Price is incredibly popular in the district.  He has never won less than 60 percent of the vote in his suburban district.  But, Democrats are hopeful the combination of an open seat and Trump’s weakness in the district (he won 47-46) compared to Romney’s commanding win (60-38) four years ago.

Democrats express optimism with the right candidate they can compete.  The district includes many of the Northern suburbs of Atlanta which includes parts of Cobb, Fulton and DeKalb counties.  The demographics of the district are not exactly conducive to an upset but the socio-economic variables of the district are.

It is a highly educated district with a median income well above the national average (and Georgia’s).  It’s voters tend to eschew social conservative firebrands and elect more congenial, conservative members.  It elected Newt Gingrich for two decades and current Georgia Senator Johnny Issakson.  Price might be more socially conservative than the prior representation but he is no Ted Cruz.  Democrats note Trump struggled among the educated and hope that tying the GOP nominee to Trump will translate to gaining moderate voters.

Throwing a wrench in Democratic plans is the unique nature of Georgia special elections.  Every candidate, regardless of party, runs on the same ballot in a system known as a “Jungle Primary” and if no candidate gets above 50 percent the top two vote getters advance to the general (again, regardless of party).

Democrats have three candidates running with a clear frontrunner in Jon Ossoff, a filmmaker who has gobbled up some serious cash.  The other two candidates are a former state rep and a current member of the lower chamber.  Neither has serious cash on hand.

On the GOP side a few have declared but the field is largely waiting on former Secretary of State and GOP gubernatorial candidate in 2010 and Senate candidate in 2014 Karen Handel.  If she jumps in due to her name ID and moderate nature she should swallow up the competition.  Democrats might as well kiss any hopes goodbye if she yes to a run.

But, even if Handel does not run, Democrats need to be careful not to split the small liberal vote in the district in such a way none of the three finishes in the top two.  In states with jungle primaries this has happened more times than either party wants to see.

With a Cook PVI of R+12 Democrats would need a significant anti-Trump backlash to form aided by an ineffective GOP Congress.  But, right now, there is little evidence this is happening.  While Trump’s approval ratings may be anemic they are holding strong among conservatives and Republican leaning voters.  The voters Democrats need to win the support of to take the seat.

Democrats really, really, want a symbolic victory and taking a conservative district that once elected Newt Gingrich, current Senator Johnny Issakson and soon to be HHS Secretary would do it.  To bad it is unlikely they will even come close.

Remember the Early Vote Totals

Historically, data on early voting has not been very insightful in predicting final outcomes.  This is why the moniker, “Democrats win the early vote while Republicans win Election Day” is a common and true refrain.  Yet, just as with many other variables in 2016, it was used as a justification to fit a narrative that Donald Trump would lose.

Many smart people have fallen into the early vote trap.  Republicans argued positives in 2012 meant Romney was in a stronger position than state polls showed.  Democrats did the same in 2014.  Trump’s camp and Republicans did not argue the early vote numbers for 2016 but the media made it seem as if the election was all but over because of it (that is until actual returns started coming in).

Not only this, but interpretations of early voting can differ by state.  For example, the Washington Post reported Hispanics early voting totals in Nevada were 99 percent higher than 2012.  Yet, Fox News argued it remained a close race.  In states that do not register voters by partisanship, early voting numbers are a patchwork of guesses at best and usually come down to urban vs. rural and red vs. blue.

This is not to say that early voting totals do not have their uses.  They do.  They can give us indicators of how a party is fairing with its base and the enthusiasm of the party faithful for their nominee.  But it does not provide enough statistical data to call an election before we have it.

Yet, that is exactly what we saw last year.  Initially, early voting numbers cited in Mid October correlated with Trump’s sagging numbers.  But once October passed and November came about with a tightening in the polls, early voting data was used in opposition to the polls.  Indeed, sites such as FiveThirtyEight and Realclearpolitics were hammered for not incorporating early voting data in their tallies.

So what happened?  Well, if you want to take the two highest profile cases of where early voting was off you can look at North Carolina and Florida.  In North Carolina, Clinton won the early vote by 2.5 percent.  The early vote comprised about 47 percent of the electorate.  But, Trump won the election day vote by 16 percent and it was 53 percent of the electorate.  Thus, Trump easily flipped the early vote totals.

What about Florida?  Well, despite Democrats recording record early turnout, Donald Trump won the state.  He lost the early vote by only 1.5 percent (compared to Romney’s 3 percent) and these votes comprised over half of the final tally.  Where about 6.4 million voters voted early an additional 3.5 million opted to wait until election day.  Among these voters, Trump crushed Clinton by double-digits.

In fact, the GOP’s election day surge was nothing new.  In North Carolina, Clinton was running behind Obama’s margins just as in Florida.  There is also evidence the Clinton campaign knew this was an issue and made last-ditch efforts to increase its lead (to no impact).  Predictably, few networks noted this trend and simply focused on the top-line numbers (forgetting the mantra above).

It should be stated early voting is still fairly knew.  Not every state has it and access varies.  New laws and regulations can impact turnout in ways we cannot measure.  For example, despite GOP voter ID laws that Democrats decry minority turnout increased in North Carolina and Florida (especially Georgia).

Additionally, early voting numbers are generally reported at once from different states and given little context.  For example, early voting numbers in Florida are reported the same way as numbers from Mississippi, despite the fact one state requires registration by party and the other does not.  This lack of context makes the numbers meaning even fuzzier.

It is also true that the networks tend to focus on one pattern over others.  For example, this cycle, many networks noted the massive surge in Latino turnout in early voting in Florida.  Less noticed was the decrease in turnout in South Florida and, later on in the night, the Midwest.  The Hispanic surge fit with the narrative the media had pushed since the beginning of the campaign about how Trump was damaged with Hispanics over immigration.

It should also be mentioned that early voting is not a good measure to use to question polls.  Many polls account for the early vote and weight accordingly.  Additionally, more and more pollsters are breaking this down in their cross-tabs for public information.

This ultimately brings up concerns over the validity of data.  There was tons of data this cycle open to interpretation.  The problem was the interpretation was one-sided.  Almost every time, polling data was used to argue Clinton was benefiting despite the fact she was lagging behind Obama among key constituencies.  Likewise, few pollsters, nor the media, talked about how beneficial it was for Trump to have such strong support in the Midwest.  Instead, it was stories about Clinton in Arizona or playing in Indiana while Trump made a desperate, last ditch appeal in Minnesota.

In this we can see the warning signs about how data can be misinterpreted.  Polling has issues and the media tends to practice group-think.  We have access to tons of data but not always the tools to make sense of it.  As such, we should be careful what conclusions we draw from data.