The Cultural Chasm Hurts Democrats With Trump Supporters

Focus groups, a dime a dozen are often used as self-fulfilling prophecies, with practitioners cherry picking facts and the data to fit their preconceived notions.  Still, it is useful to pay attention to them from time to time.  One recent study, from Democratic pollster Stanley Greenburg, stands out.

Greenburg, an icon in partisan polling circles, interviewed 35 Independent and Democratic voters from Macomb County, Michigan.  All supported Trump.  All these voters are considered swing voters and all showed consistent loyalty to Trump throughout the focus group even as Greenburg concluded his report by saying Democrats could win over these voters by pivoting leftward on economic issues.

The report should be required reading for Democrats seeking a path out of the political wilderness.  For while the Democrats majority-minority, college educated,white female and upper suburbanite base is frothing at the mouth in anger at Trump, the party’s former backers are not. Yes, Democrats could make small gains with Trump supporters in the Midwest if they become more populist.  But, the cultural disconnect between the party and Trump voters is so wide it is hard to see Democrats making the necessary compromises to win over this disaffected constituency and maintain their hold on their current support.

Now, despite Greenburg’s partisan leanings he does know what he is doing.  He was the original pioneer of the idea of “Reagan Democrats” in the 1980’s when he conducted several studies on the county’s voters.  For while these voters have always had Democratic leanings they have never been solid Democrats.  Consider Obama won Michigan by 10 points in 2012 but he only won the county by four points.  Still, this made Greenburg wonder whether the county’s blue collar roots still mattered.  That was until last year when Trump won the county by a commanding 12 points and commanded a 50,000+ vote advantage that helped him carry the state.

Among some of the study’s most notable findings were 1) Trump’s base is extremely loyal, 2) culture matters, 3) Obamacare is still unpopular and 4) few of these voters are receptive to supporting Democrats.  Let’s take each of these in turn.

1. Trump’s base is loyal: Not a single voter in the survey said they regretted voting for Trump.  This, despite the President languishing with 40 percent approval ratings.  Additionally, these voters liked his “bluntness,” “outspokenness,” and “honesty.”  They further accepted Trump’s version of the news and facts and their reactions to videos of his press conferences and interviews reinforced the point, Greenburg wrote.

In the GOP’s quest to implement its agenda on America this loyalty matters.  For example, the NY Times had a story out Sunday questioning whether the party could hold the blue-collar Midwest and repeal Obamacare.  Except, many of these voters dislike the law (more on this in a second) and they trust the President.  They see the benefits of healthcare as a result of Trump, not the former President, and they believe Trump will look out for their interests.  Even if it means challenging Republican leaders in Congress.

2. It’s the culture, stupid: Greenburg believes the party can make gains with these voters on economics but read between the lines and it is clear even Greenburg believes this has limited pull with these voters.  While these voters align with Democrats on several major issues (including entitlements and healthcare) on cultural issues they are miles apart.  These Trump voters cited concerns about terrorism, immigration and lack of integration, worsening race relations and more.  Such talk dominated the focus group, even among those who once backed Obama.

3. Obamacare’s newfound national popularity did not show in the focus group: Democrats are crowing about Obamacare’s newfound popularity, even among Trump/Obama supporters.  One problem, it did not show in the focus group.  Indeed, many participants in the survey shared horror stories about their health insurance as a consequence of Obamacare, citing personal examples of how the law was a hardship for them.

Citing the group, Greenburg writes, “early every per­son in our group was struggling with how to afford their plans, co-pays, and med­ic­a­tions.”  No concrete alternatives were discussed but they did show they had faith in Trump to fix the healthcare system and look out for their best interests.

4. The biggie, no one expressed receptivity to supporting Democrats: If Democrats want to regain control of Congress they are going to have to make gains in the Midwest and the focus group’s responses highlight the party’s struggle.  Despite agreeing with general liberal policy preferences the group did not show much receptivity to supporting Democratic candidates.

Greenburg notes about two-thirds of the focus group supported a generic, populist Democrat more than a moderate, business friendly candidate who supports globalization.  That’s great and all, but generic candidates do not win elected office.  Actual candidates do.  Greenburg puts a pitch in for progressive icons like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren who fit the populist profile.  But, the focus group did not seem enthusiastic about either.  Worse, the group showed little support for any other progressive icon on the horizon (including Joe Biden).

The study was commissioned by a progressive think-tank so it is little wonder Greenburg sprinkles in analysis with optimistic takeaways and pronouncements.  Except, these voters gave no indication they were giving up on Trump anytime soon.

The study should stand as yet another warning for the party.  Despite becoming more diverse and multi-cultural, the party has limited its electoral reach.  By putting the blame of worsening race relations, a stagnant economy, wage inequality, intolerance, bigotry and more squarely on the shoulders of blue-collar whites they have bled their cultural connection to these voters.

Democrats for years have had warnings this was coming.  All the way back in 1992, Bill Clinton recognized his party was out of step with these voters and took on the worse excesses of his party in a bid to redefine what a Democrat was.  He was extremely successful, winning back Macomb County for his party in 1996.  In subsequent elections, his party did not follow suit.  Al Gore won the county narrowly in 2000 and George Bush took it in 2004 (thanks to John Kerry’s inept campaign).  While the county backed Obama in 2008 and 2012, it did so only because Obama ran as a populist in the region, seeking to defend the average Joe from a Republican (Mitt Romney) that would ship their job overseas.

These voters were never really loyal to the Democratic Party even as they backed Obama.  They backed Congressional Republicans up and down the ballot that year, in the prior midterm  and the midterm after.  Since Clinton, Democrats have been losing their appeal to these voters.  Now, any cultural connection the party has with these voters is gone.  That’s great news for Trump and Republicans.  It is bad, bad news for a reeling Democratic Party.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Millennials Aren’t Saving The Democratic Party

Still smarting over a humbling defeat in 2016 and a daunting Congressional map in 2018 the party is looking forward to 2020.  Specifically, because of President Trump’s persistent weakness with Millennials and their potent growth they are poised to offer the party a pathway forward to power.

Writing in the Atlantic, Ronald Brownstein lays out the basic Democratic premise.  By 2020, the share of the electorate represented by Millennials is expected to eclipse Boomers.  They continue to oppose Trump at higher rates than other generations of voters and Democrats hope Trump makes the GOP irreversibly racist in their eyes.

But, this analysis (Democrats, not Brownstein’s), is overly simplistic at best and devoid of data at worst. Consider, that in 2000 Bush and Gore split the youth vote.  A mere four years later Kerry won them by nine and Obama carried them by a massive 36 and 30 point margins.  Trump lost Millennials by a small margin than Romney.  Not necessarily an indication of an increasingly liberal bloc.

Of course, not all Millennials are the same.  Trump did not need to do better with all Millennials.  Just certain Millennials.  For comparison, Romney and Obama actually ran close to even among college educated white Millennials.  But among blue-collar Millennials Romney won by 10.  Now flip the script and Hillary ran circles around Trump with white, college educated Millennials.  But Trump won blue-collar Millennials in the right states by massive margins.

Take a look at some of Brownstein’s analysis.  “Exit polls found Trump reduced the GOP deficit among those younger voters compared with Romney in 2012 in Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and he actually carried voters under 30 in Iowa. In all of those states except Michigan, Clinton’s vote share among those younger than 30 fell by double digits compared with Obama’s, while Trump improved by 7 to 9 percentage points over Romney. Trump also significantly improved over Romney among young people in New Hampshire and Maine, two mostly white states. Even in the coastal and Sunbelt states where Trump’s vote share among young people was either stagnant or slightly below Romney’s, Clinton’s numbers usually lagged Obama’s, sometimes significantly, as more Millennials drifted away to the third-party options.”

Further complicating Democratic hopes, the share of college educated Millennials in many of the swing states heading into the 2020 election are unlikely to change by a significant percentage.  Sure, Democrats might find somebody better able to appeal to them but odds are good that will turn off their college educated base.  Everything in politics involves a trade-off.

Just look at how the baby boomer vote has shifted over the years.  In 2000, Bush and Gore deadlocked.  But in every election since they have become increasingly Republican.  Unlike Millennials, Boomers also vote far above their actual demographic numbers.  Millennials, not to much.

Democrats would counter Millennials might even turn Georgia or Arizona, perhaps Texas, in four years.  But if they could not pull it this year when every dirty secret about Trump was aired, what are the chances it will happen in 2020?  If nothing else, no higher.

In 2016, Clinton put a massive amount of importance on their votes.  She had reason according to the polls.  Again, according to Brownstein, “In one survey for the liberal groups Project New America and NextGen Climate, which looked solely at Millennials across 11 battleground states, three-fourths of them described him as a racist; roughly an equal number said he was biased against women; and almost 70 percent said they would be “ashamed” for the country if he won.” Yet, on Election Day, Clinton only won 55 percent of their votes.

A common theory batted around about this is that these voters were drawn third party candidates because of James Comey.  But the only exit poll to ask third party supporters who they would vote for if it was Trump or Clinton found a massive 55 percent would not even show up.

Further presenting problems for Democrats in the run-up to the midterms is Millennials have horrible turnout in midterms.  In 2010 and 2014 turnout dropped precipitously from the prior Presidential elections.

It is also unclear how late generation Millennials and the up and coming Social Media generation will shape the path of the youth vote.  John Sides notes that generations of voters tend to lean more towards the opposite party than the one of the President they grew up under. Worse, while the youngest voters are the most diverse they also seem to behave the most conservatively on fiscal issues.

Predicting long-term is a horrible business in politics.  But, we do know Millennial turnout is likely to drop next year.  Even if it it increases massively in 2020 the Presidential map will likely be fought on turf more favorable to the GOP than not.  Whether Millennials can, and will, help Democrats beyond that is the question.

My word of advice for the party.  Don’t put all your eggs in that basket.  Just ask how that turned out for Hillary Clinton.

 

 

 

 

Minnesota Puts To Rest The Gerrymandering Is Destiny Theory

Democrats have suffered historic losses in recent years.  While honest Democrats will admit that their losses are due to self-inflicted wounds including Obamacare, ignoring the concerns of blue-collar workers and focusing almost exclusively on a urban coalition, less honest Democrats seek a scapegoat not of their making.  That scapegoat is gerrymandering.

After the 2010 election Republicans had the ability to draw lines in dozens of states to their advantage.  They did this to deadly effect in states all across the Midwest and the South.  But, in handful of states, including Minnesota, the idea that gerrymandering is PRIMARILY responsible for the Republican advantage in the states and Congress is shown as a lie.

Minnesota has not voted for a statewide, federal Republican candidate since 2002.  Donald Trump’s narrow loss was the first time since the 60’s when the state was more Republican than the nation.  Minnesota’s substantial leftward tilt in statewide races can be attributed to the power of urban Minneapolis and St. Paul and the power of GOP leaning suburbs and rural areas cannot match the raw vote share of these areas (unlike Wisconsin, Pennsylvania or Michigan).

While the Twin Cities give Democrats an advantage in statewide races (which has been eroding for some time) the same cannot be said for legislative races.  Indeed, a federal court redrew the legislative lines in a nonpartisan manner in 2011 the legislature has traded hands.  Republicans held the legislature for two years (2010-2012), lost it, regained the state House in 2014 and gained additional seats in the state House and regained the state Senate by a single seat last November.

Democrats have been beset by a number of issues in many states, not just in Minnesota.  The party suffers from having many of its voters clustered in urban, dense locales and in limited geographies.  This leads to thousands of wasted votes while the Republican vote is better distributed.

But, according to calculations by the Daily Kos, the median district in Minnesota is actually pretty close to the median district in the United States.  The median district in the US is 3.4 percent more Republican than the nation (according to the 2016 election).   The median district in Minnesota has about a 3 percent GOP edge.  Pretty similar eh?  Again, the GOP did not even draw the lines in Minnesota and this is including the fact the Daily Kos’s calculations do not factor in redistricting in big, blue states like California because the map was drawn by an “independent commission.”

Democrats will of course point to gerrymanders in states like Wisconsin to prove their point.  States such as Wisconsin do have effective gerrymanders.  But shifting voter preference has also played a significant factor.

Sticking with Minnesota as the star of the article, Trump won five of the state’s legislative districts (despite three of them being held by rural, conservative to moderate Democrats).  A mere four years ago Romney only won three of these districts (and no, the state did not go through a mid-decade redistricting).

The contrast between the legislative district results between 2012 and 2016 are even more striking.  Donald Trump carried 39 of the state’s 67 senate districts and 72 of the state’s 134 house districts.  In 2012, Romney only carried 66 house districts.  It is the state Senate where the bottom has fallen out for the party.  Romney only carried 29 senate seats but this go-round Trump carried a whopping 39.  It bears repeating, under a nonpartisan map.  It is very likely this scenario is similarly repeated in nonpartisan redistricting states such as Iowa because of the shifting nature of the parties coalitions.

To be fair, down-ballot Democrats found success even as Trump was carrying their districts.  Seven Democrats represent Trump supporting Senate districts while only two Republicans sit in Clinton supporting districts.  In the House, seven Democrats sit in Trump districts and 12 Republicans in Clinton districts (quite a bit of crossover).  But, this does make it harder for candidates to outrun the top of the ticket for obvious reasons.

This is not to say that gerrymandering has not contributed to the GOP success.  But arguing it is the primary reason is tenuous at best and most likely finds its most receptive audience in the ears of partisans desperate to explain the fate of their party.

 

Trump Had The Better Electoral Strategy

Donald Trump’s campaign strategy was ridiculed from here to Timbuktu by political nerds, GOP and Democratic strategists and the media.  Trump staked his claim to victory on riding a wave of populist sentiment to victory across the Midwest.

By any standard definition, Wisconsin would not be thought of as a tipping point state (see definition here) but it was.  However, so confident was the Clinton campaign that Trump was not competitive in the state that they visited the state, count it with me now, zero times.  She did not set foot in the state after losing to Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary in April.

To be fair, Wisconsin and other Midwestern Blue Wall states had demographics that did not favor the party.  They are chalk full of blue-collar whites, Trump’s bread and butter, polls showed Clinton ahead, and Sunbelt states were looking due to demographics and polling to be in reach.

Of course, this did not turn out.  Clinton lost every Blue Wall state except Minnesota.  Obviously, you could say that Clinton should have visited Wisconsin.  She should have gone to Michigan more than once and she should have done more to appeal to rural Pennsylvania.  But, that said, this probably did not cost her by itself the election.

No, what cost Clinton the election was Trump’s gamble on stealing Democratic electoral votes.  Trump gambled due to demographics, the industries of these states and their reddening shift since 2014 would allow him to eke out victories over a weak Clinton.  Meanwhile, Clinton staked her campaign’s victory on winning states like North Carolina and Georgia.  Who had the better strategy is in the winner of the tipping state.

Typifying the states the candidates considered most important can probably be gleaned by simply looking at where they spent their time.  By this measure, both Trump and Clinton considered Florida to be the most important state, followed by North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Ohio for Clinton.  Trump considered Pennsylvania the second most important state followed by North Carolina and Ohio.  But after that the visits look completely different with Trump spending time in Colorado, Michigan and Wisconsin while Clinton spent time in Iowa, Nevada and Georgia.

If one digs deeply they can find some of these visiting differences are found on the margins.  Rather, it seems Clinton made two significant tactical mistakes (at least according to fivethirtyeight and ones I agree with).

Clinton focused only on close states: According to RCP averages the closest states were Florida, Iowa, Ohio, Nevada and North Carolina.  Obviously the polls were off in Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania but this was not reflected until the final results.

Where Clinton made her mistake was focusing only on these “must-win states.”  If Clinton won these states she would hit around 300 electorate votes.  That is nothing to sneeze at but if you lose Iowa and Florida you lose 35 electoral votes and the race is a toss-up.  Clinton never tried to cushion her margin by focusing on keeping already blue states in her column.  If the campaign had paid attention they would have notice the shifting winds late in the campaign and seen Trump gaining strength among the blue-collar workers who supported Obama a mere four years earlier.

Fivethirtyeight notes that Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania up to the beginning of November narrowly mimicked the national polling averages (as in they were most likely to be the tipping state).  Obviously, they did not follow the trendline in the polls after the beginning of November but they did in the final results.  So, if the race narrowed, as it did before Election Day it would follow that these states would also be more competitive (regardless of what the polls said).

Even if you give Clinton the benefit of the argument and argue a good offense is a good defense Clinton’s campaign blundered.  Clinton only made a token effort to steal GOP states like Georgia and Arizona whereas Trump ran all over the place at the end of the campaign.  He even went to Minnesota.  Whereas Florida and North Carolina were not necessarily must win states for Clinton they were for Trump.  Clinton, instead of focusing on Ohio and Iowa, states that were not near the national polling average, should have parked herself in these states and focused on not letting Trump gain even a smidgen of momentum.

Clinton’s overconfidence showed in the narrow range of states she campaigned in: Clinton played to a much narrower base of states to win than Trump.  Where Clinton spent no time in Virginia, Minnesota, Colorado or Minnesota, Trump spent time in all of them.  He actually won none of these states but the point is that he was trying to expand the map.

The critical difference here between Clinton and Trump is that Trump’s visits reflected the overall uncertainty of the race while the Clinton camp assumed the race was all but over.  Indeed, the massive polling shifts in the race we saw time and time again should have been an indication of the volatility in the electorate.

The fact there were indications of volatility in the race could have led to any number of things happening; suburbanites could have swung to Trump, turnout in urban areas could have surged, etc.  The point is that the polls, the media and all the analysis in the world can be wrong, and because these things lead to unpredictably you want to make your path to victory as wide as possible.

Supposedly, the Clinton campaign had the most data savvy team ever assembled.  So why did the Clinton camp make this mistake?  Because they bought their own hype.  Internal models were incredibly overconfident and alternate models built on lower urban turnout, lower college educated turnout, never occurred.

This problem can be compounded with internal polls.  Campaigns only spit out good internal polls.  In states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Indiana this is why few GOP candidates put out internal numbers but Democrats spit them out up and down the ballot.

Of course, where to spend money and a candidate’s time is never made in a vaccuum.  Internal politics and external politics have an impact.  In Clinton’s case this was certainly true.  Clinton’s campaign was so intertwined with the DNC that millions were spent to run up the vote in big cities in safe red Kansas City) and blue states (Chicago).  Clinton’s campaign was religiously devoted to control.  As a result, the campaign did not provide local, on the ground volunteers.  Finally, the campaign did not run a GoTV campaign until the final days of the campaign assuming their turnout would not need to be substantially goosed.

If you are confused by this you would be forgiven.  If you thought the Clinton campaign had a robust, well oiled volunteer machine you would be forgiven.  It was entirely driven by the media and perception.

Even worse, coverage of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Electoral College was missing any context.  For example, on Nov. 3 the New York Times went after Trump for campaigning in too wide a range of states (including Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania).  This too wide range of states is exactly the reason Trump won.  With the race tightening Trump found the soft spots in Clinton’s weaknesses in these states.  The rest is history.

Speaking of context, on the ground analysis was often missing or half-assed (pardon my french).  For example, if Clinton spent money in Indiana or Arizona to boost downballot Democratic candidates it was a sign of strength.  But, if Trump showed up in New Mexico or Minnesota it showed just how desperate he was.  Indeed, this was just a continuation of the press fueling the narrative Trump did not have a coherent campaign strategy.

Speaking of the media, it was clear just how much it drove the election.  Whenever Trump was in the news he sank in the polls.  Whenever Clinton was in the news she sunk.  To a degree this might explain why Clinton never fully abandoned states like Ohio and Iowa (where she consistently polled behind) which would have led to media freakout.  It also helps explain why the campaign made questionable tactical decisions to spend money in Indiana and Arizona.  It generated positive headlines.

Credit needs to go where credit is due though.  Trump’s data analytics team, despite getting little credit, should get some.  They saw where Trump was weak and kept him away from those states (he did not show up in CA or NY as he said he would earlier in the campaign).  In turn, they honestly assessed where he could win, how and directed his attention to those places.  The media would never give that much credit to this successful strategy and has not.

Indeed, short of a single interview, Trump’s analytics team at Cambridge Analytics has largely been obscured until recently.  Even the models they built saw Trump winning very, very rarely.  But, the proof is in the final results.  And so is the vindication of a campaign strategy derided for so much of the campaign.